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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

)
)

MELVILLE L. MORRIS,

)

Plaintiff and
Respondent,

)
)

)

vs.

)

DWANE J. SYKES and
PATRICIA SYKES,

Case No. 16838

)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants and
Appellants.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by respondent asking
the trial court for a mandatory injunction ordering the appellants to accept the unpaid balance due under a land purchase
contract and to execute and deliver a warranty deed to the
property to the respondent, or in the alternative, to relieve
the respondent from the harshness of the retaking of the property by the seller without compensation to the buyer pursuant
to the contract and asking the court to order the appellants
to return to respondent the money paid by respondent on the
contract or such part as the Court might deem equitable.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried without a jury on June 14, 15 and
18, 1979, before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock sitting in
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equity without a jury.

The Court found in favor of the appel-

lants and against the respondent on the demand for a mandatory
injunction requiring delivery of title to the property.

The

Court found for the respondent and against the appellants
holding that the retaking of the property by the appellants
·was an wholly unreasonable penalty and denying literal enforcement of the contract terms.

The Court entered judgment

requiring a reimbursement to the respondent buyer of $14,121.54.
Appellants filed a Motion to Amend Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Judgment or in the Alternative for
a New Trial, which Motion was denied by the Court on December
24, 1979.

The appellants appealed that decision of the

Court and its denial of the Motion to Amend Findings or in
the Alternative for a New Trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT.ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have the Court reverse the trial
court, to apply the Alaska law to the case and to declare that
the retaking of the property under all of the circumstances then
existing was a reasonable application of the contract terms.
Appellants seek to have this court rule that the appellants
did not receive anything more than that which they were entitled
to under the contract and that respondent is not entitled to
any recovery in this proceeding.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 3, 1974, the respondent, as buyer,
entered into a real estate contract with the appellants, as
sellers,

(Ex. 1) for a tract of land of approximately 27

acres known as Tract "B" of the Musk Ox Subdivision located
near Fairbanks, Alaska.

The contract provided for a $2,000.00

down payment and monthly payments of a minimum of $350.00
commencing December 1, 1974.

In addition to the monthly

payments, the buyer was obligated by the contract to pay
$1,000.00 on November 1, 1974, $5,000.00 on February 1, 1975,
$5,000.00 on August 1, 1975, and $3,000.00 each succeeding
February 1 and August 1 until November 1, 1978, when the entire
unpaid balance would be due.
On the same day as the signing of the contract, the
parties executed an escrow agreement,

(Ex. 23) and on that

day buyer and seller went to the off ice of attorney Gene Belland.
At the office, appellant, Dwane Sykes, read

the escrow instruc-

tions and documents prepared to be executed as Exhibit 23 to
the respondent.

(Testimony of Dwane Sykes, Record, 256: 5-10).

The contract and the escrow instructions required that the
payments under the contract would be paid to the First National
Bank of Fairbanks, Alaska.

Mr. Sykes informed the plaintiff

that there was an existing mortgage on the property at the time
of purchase and the agreements instructed the bank to apply any
funds received to the payment of such mortgage upon the property.

(Ex. 23, Escrow Instructions, paragraph 3, subparagraph
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b; Record 256: 13-18).

After the execution of the

a~reements,

the appellant, Dwane Sykes, moved to the State of Utah.

The

respondent variously lived in Florida, California, and Brussels,
Belgium.

Payments were to be made to the escrow department of

the First National Bank of Fairbanks pursuant to paragraph 2 of
the real estate contract,

(Ex. 1) and the escrow instructions

(Ex. 23).
On November 16, 1975, appellant, Sykes, sent a letter
to respondent enclosing a proposed contract of sale on two
additional parcels upon which they had been negotiating.

The

respondent counteroffered to purchase Lot 13 only setting forth
the terms.

(Reply, Ex. 18).
On December 3, 1975, appellant, Sykes, responded

(Ex. 2) accepting the counteroffer and enclosing a purchase
contract for Lot 13 exactly as the counteroffer of respondent.
Respondent never made the payments on Lot 13 as offered in
writing (Ex. 18) and accepted by the appellant (Ex. 3).

This

failure to complete later became a problem in the parties'
dealings.

In that letter,

(Ex. 2) appellant, Sykes, gave

notice to the plaintiff by the second postscript that "Fairbanks
bank indicates they have not received payments on the Musk Ox
escrow 10557 (Ex. 23) and informed respondent that he was
several months behind.

Responding to the December 3, 1975

letter by a letter of December 17, 1975,

(Ex. 19) respondent

said, "Re: the February payment, will get it into bank as
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early as I can.

Also, I've written to the bank on being in

arrears - my records indicate up to date currently, so
upon their reply we can check out the discrepency."
supplied]

The testimony of respondent shows that the payments

recorded by the bank were the only payments paid.
14-23; Record 215: 6-12).
made all the

pay~ents

(Record 220:6-12}.
times,

[Emphasis

(Record 205:

It further.shows that respondent

personally and not by any other person.

Respondent knew he was delinquent at all

(Record 220: 19-22; Record 211: 5-16) and that his

letter claiming that his records showed him to be current, was
a misrepresentation given to the appellant regarding his payments
to the bank (Ex. 19).
On the 29th of December, 1975, Steve Arnold, appellant's
accountant, wrote to the respondent (Ex. 3) regarding the delinquency in the escrow which informed respondent that at that
time he was four month's delinquent and that by the time of the
receipt of the letter, would be five month's delinquent at
$350.00 per month or $1,750.00.

That letter further informed

him that appellant, Sykes, was depending upon the payments on
the contract by respondent

to~meet

Sykes commitments on the

mortgage to First National Bank of Fairbanks and that it was
subject to immediate termination of both his interests and
Mr. Sykes if payments were not brought current.

Exhibit 3(a)

attached to that letter shows the calculations of payments
received, compared to the payments due up through December of
1975.
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On the same date, December 29, 1975, appellant wrote
to the First National Bank Escrow Department,

(Ex. 22 and Ex.

27) with a copy to respondent requesting and authorizing the
escrow department to automatically make payments from the
escrow to the note owed to First National Bank to keep the note
current.

He further informed respondent,of the dependency of

Mr. Sykes upon his monthly payments to meet the payments to the
bank.
Respondent did not correct the $1,750.00 delinquency
as requested and on February 11, 1976, respondent, by letter
to appellant, Sykes (Ex. 14) again misrepresented that the bank
records were inaccurate and claiming that a $700.00 and two
$350.00 checks were not reflected and that he had sent to the
bank a tracer on these matters.
Because of the repeated claims by Mr. Morris that
he had made payments that were not shown by the bank, Walt
Hick, an accountant for Mr. Sykes, sent a communication to the
bank with a copy to respondent attempting to verify if there
was any differences in payments received and what the bank
records showed (Ex. 21) •
On September 2, 1976, the plaintiff requested a "good
discount" for prepayment on the Musk Ox property and conditioned
his purchase of Lots 13 and 14 at a lesser price upon obtaining
a discount, if a discount acceptable to him could be allowed
(Ex. 20).
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On September 30 or October 2, 1976, respondent,
in a telephone conversation with Dwane Sykes, conditioned
payoff at the Musk Ox property upon obtaining a discount.
Mr. Sykes denied that request (Record 80: 12-23; Record 166:
4-9).

In that same telephone conversation, appellant Sykes

informed respondent that it was very important that he keep the
payments at the bank current because if he was delinquent, he
would be terminated under the contract.

Mr.

Sykes informed

respondent that Mr. Sykes' payments to the bank were 100 percent dependent upon respondent's payments to the escrow account
under the purchase agreement.

Respondent informed Mr. Sykes

that he would personally go into the bank and verify his escrow
account status and bring it current (Record 165-167; Record 80:
2-16) .
On October 14, 1976, the respondent telephoned
appellant Sykes at Orem, Utah and Dennis Sykes, appellant's
brother, got on the extension telephone and overheard and
described the conversation in his deposition (Record 82).
Respondent again asked for a $1,000.00 discount as a condition
of prepayment on the Musk Ox contract.
give the discount.

Dwane Sykes declined to

Dwane Sykes again told respondent that

the accountant's records in Utah showed respondent delinquent
and that the bank had not provided any information to verify
or refute that (Record 83: 6-8).

Respondent misrepresented
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that he had been into the bank and had already brought his
payments completely current, "having just within the past few
days paid a major amount covering some months, receipts of
which perhaps had not reached Utah through the mails"
83: 9-13).

(Record

The record of payments paid show that no payments

were paid by respondent after August 2, 1976

(Ex .. 5).

Respon-

dent again misrepresented to Mr. Sykes payments ostensibly
made in Alaska

(Record 82: 8-12).

In that conversation,

Dwane Sykes informed the respondent that he would not permit
any delinquency on his Musk Ox sale to respondent (Record 83:
21-23).
In early November, Mr. Sykes learned that respondent
was seriously delinquent on the payments on the Musk Ox property and that respondent had not made payments in October
as he had represented.

Respondent had not kept the contract

current nor had he brought any payments current over the entire
period of the contract.

Appellant further learned that respon-

dent's representations had all been false representations of
payments which respondent knew had not been paid

(Record 83:

26-32; Record 84: 1-4).
On November 11, 1976, appellant's accountant, Walt
Hick, served the notice of termination under the contract on
the bank with copies to respondent, both in Mango, Florida
and Brussels, Belgium (Ex. 4).
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After the termination, appellant, Sykes, offered
reinstatement of the Musk Ox contract by a telephone conversation between Sykes and Morris on November 18, 1976.

That

offer of reinstatement was confirmed by a reply message
(Ex. 29) of November 19, 1976.

The respondent declined to

reinstate.
By a letter dated November 24, 1976 {Ex. 28) the
bank demanded payment of a delinquency of $1,573.87 plus $339.39
interest by December 8,. 19 7 6.
On December 27, 1976 appellant's attorney wrote to
the respondent (Ex. 19) offering reinstatement and setting
forth the requirements for bringing the account current, and
set January 25, 1977 as the expiration of the offer of reinstatement.
On the 18th of January, 1977, the respondent declined
the reinstatement and said he found the terms unacceptable
(Ex. 11).

No tender of any payment to bring the contract current

or to make any payments under the contract were ever made by
the respondent {Record 224: 24-30).

On the same date, January

18, 1977, appellant's attorney sent a further letter to
respondent (Ex. 25) reiterating the privilege of reinstatement
and the expiration date of reinstatement offer for January
25, 1977.
On January 28, 1977, appellant's attorney again
wrote to the respondent respondent reminding him of the reinstatement offers made on the 18th of November, 1976 in a telephone

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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call with Mr. Sykes, the reiteration of that offer in the
November 19 Memo from Mr. Sykes to respondent (Ex. 29);
the reinstatement offer of December 27, 1976; and informed
him that if he did not wish to reinstate, that was up to
him but, since he had passed the January 25, 1977 expiration
date of the reinstatement offer, the presumption of the appellants was that he did not wish to reinstate.

Respondent never

communicated an answer to appellant's attorney.
On February 9, i977, the bank informed Mr. Sykes
that unless the $3,318.68 delinquency was paid within thirty
(30) days, that the bank would declare the entire unpaid balance
on the mortgage due and accelerate the note and foreclose the
deed of trust inunediately (Ex. 30).
The Sykes were thus faced with an imminent foreclosure of their Musk Ox property by the bank under its trust
deed.

They were located in Utah and the property was in

Fairbanks, Alaska.

It was mid-winter and the property was

totally inaccessible.

Mr. Sykes attempted to refinance the

mortgage payment to pay the bank out (Record 299: l; Record
300: 20-30).

Appellants, after several attempts to sell the

property, obtained a sale of the property to the only market
available, a buyer who had previously purchased property from
appellants and would rely upon their statement as to the
property without an examination of it.

They sold the property

under such distress circumstances to John Iverson, their
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brother-in-law, for the unpaid balance owed by the respondent
upon the purchase contract.

No windfall profits were obtained

by the appellants as a result of the sale.

They only received

what they would have received had the respondent completed the
payments under his contract.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED THE ALASKA LAW
FORFEITURE AND DAMAGES.

ON

In this matter the trial court indicated that the
law of Alaska was the applicable law, but indicated that the
Court did not believe that the-Alaska law was significantly
different than Utah law.

Thereafter, the trial court dealt

with the case on the basis of applying established principles
of law under Utah decisions more familiar to the Court.
Utah Court in applying Utah law has never applied a
forfeiture in a real estate contract.

The

strict

It has applied various

formulas requiring the Court to take into account the reasonable rental value for the period of time the purchaser has been
in possession of the property, interest which could have been
earned had the payments been met, damages to the property and
loss of bargain.

This Court, applying Utah law, has generally

allowed a refund to the defaulting purchaser for the excess
over the reasonable damages of the vendor calculated under a
variety of formulas which is considered to be a windfall to the
vendor and reimbursable to the vendee.
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Alaskan law is considerably different than Utah
law.

The Alaska Court does recognize the right of a vendor to

enforce the provisions of a forfeiture in the event of default
by the vendee.

In 1967 the Alaska Court, speaking in Lonas v.

Metropolitan Mortgage and Securities

Co.~

432 P.2d 603 (1967)

construed a real estate contract containing a provision almost
identical to the contract provision on forfeiture contained in
the contract which is the subject matter of this action (Ex.
1).

The provision in the Lonas case reads at page 605:
Time is of the essence of this contract,
and in case of failure of the said purchasers to make either of the payments
or perform any of the covenants on their
part, this contract shall be forfeited and
determined at the election of the said
vendor; and the said purchasers shall
forfeit all payments made by them on
this contract and all rights acquired
hereunder, and such payments shall be
retained by the said vendor as liquidated
damages, and they shall have the right
to re-enter and take possession of said
land and premises and every part thereof.
In the case now before the Court, the contract

provis~

read:
Time is of the essence of this contract,
and in the event of failure of buyer to
make any payment falling due hereunder
within thirty days after due date thereof,
or to abide any other obligation hereinundertaken, the seller may, at any time
while such failure continues, terminate
this contract and all purchase rights
herein afforded to buyer, and pursuant thereto
may re-enter and retake possession of said
real estate, and all payments made theretofore shall be retained·by the seller as
liquidated damages for failure of performance
hereunder by the buyer.
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The Alaska Court stated in the Lonas case at page

605:
The forfeiture provision is not made
exclusive.
In such a case, the seller
is entitled to pursue, in addition to the
remedy specifically mentioned in the
contract , any other remedy which the
law affords.
The seller in this case was
not limited to the remedy of forfeiture
of the contract, but could seek judgment for monies past due and for specific
performance.
[Emphasis supplied]
The Alaska law thus makes it clear that the seller is entitled
to the remedy provided in the contract, of forfeiture of the
contract, if he so elects.
In Alaska.Placer Company v. Richard E. Lee, Alaska,

455 P.2d 218 (1969) the Alaska Supreme Court distinguished
the earlier cases of Land Development, Inc. v. Padgett,
369.P.2d 888 (Alaska 1962) and Jameson v. Wurtz, 396 P.2d
68 (Alaska 1964) which the court said stood for the proposition that under some circumstances it may be inequitable
to enforce a forfeiture because the loss to the buyers would
be all out of proportion to the injury to the seller, and
held in that case at page 229:
This is not a case where appellant sat
idly by, registered no objections, and
then attempted to forfeit appellees'
interest under the contract at a time
when it was too late for appellees to
remedy their f alure to perform.
and further said:
We find that there was not a waiver by
appellant of its right of forfeiture
under the contract. Nor did the notice
of forfeiture come too late to be effective.
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Thus, the Alaska Court recognizes the right of the vendor to
forfeit out the interest of the vendee when the losses of the
vendor are not disproportionate to those of the vendee.
In the case now before the Court, the forfeiture
and subsequent sale of the property by the vendor, appellant
Sykes, produced less than the amount of funds that would have
been produced had the vendee made his payments as required by
the contract and the determination by the trial court to refund
monies paid by the vendee·imposed all of the losses in the
matter upon the vendor and none upon the vendee, who was the
defaulting party in the matter.
In the 1972 case of McCormick v. Grove, Alaska 495
P.2d 1268, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the trial court
properly had the discretion to refuse to enforce the forfeiture
because, "the sellers never 'hinted' that they would terminate
because of the late payments."

In the case now before the

Court, not only had the sellers sent two notices citing the
delinquencies and informing buyers they were subject to termination (Exs. 2 and 3) but had several telephone communications
repeatedly making demands to keep the accounts current, indicating the failure to do so would cause termination of the
contract.

(Record 80: 12-23; Record 166:4-9; Record 82: 8-12;

Record 83: 6-23)
The case

cited in the Lonas case of Land Development,

Inc. v. Padgett, supra., was decided in 1962 and in that case
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the buyers had paid $9,500.00, leaving a balance due of only
$2,400.00.

The Court refused to enforce literally the for-

feiture provision of the contract and this was upheld by the
Supreme Court.

The Court noting that the vendor's rights

" ••. were fully protected; for if the buyers failed to pay the
balance owing by the time specified in the judgment, then
their interest in the property would then be entirely forfeited
and the seller would regain possession."
added]

Id. 889 [Emphasis

In the circumstance before the Court, the bank had served

upon the seller-appellant notice of intended forfeiture and
foreclosure of the trust deed owed by seller to First National
Bank of Fairbanks.

In the event of such foreclosure by the

bank upon the seller as a result of buyers defaults, seller
would have lost all interest in the property.

Vendors' rights

were not fully protected as in Land Development v. Padgett,
supra.

In this matter, seller-appellant did not obtain by the

sale to Iverson more than what he would have obtained had the
respondent-buyer met his payments.

In the Land Development,

Inc. v. Padgett case, supra., the Court said that the reason
the trial court has been justified in refusing to enforce the
forefeiture provision was because there was no anticipated
losses to seller and the losses to buyer were out of proportion.

In this case, the effect of the trial court's ruling was

to impose all loss on the appellant-sellers with no loss to the
respondent-buyer.
The other case cited by the Alaska court in support
of the proposition that the Court under certain circumstances,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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has the discretion to ignore the contract provision, was
Jamison v. Wurtz, supra., where the Court held that where the
vendor had received 88.3% of the total purchase price and
where the purchaser had tendered the balance of the purchase
price into the Court at the time of institution of the suit,
that it would have been inequitable for the Court to have
enforced the literal provisions of the forfeiture under the
contract.

That is not the.circumstances in the case now before

the Court.
The Supreme Court of Alaska has further ruled that
the ultimate aim of the Court rendering a decision where a
vendee has defaulted in payments upon a land purchase contract
in an equity proceeding challenging whether or not a forfeiture
is to be allowed is exemplified in Ward v. Union Bond and Trust
Co., 243 F.2d 476 (1957) wherein the court said at page 480:
The ultimate aim in these proceedings
in equity must be to save the respective
parties harmless from loss or damage
and,if just and equitable, place them in
the status quo of their contract so as to
permit them as vendor and vendee to each
have the benefit of their respective barqains
voluntarily entered into, . . . not to be
measured in the light or economics of
subsequent events, but as of the day of the
contract.
The Court thus illustrated that the examination in equity
should determine whether the results gave the parties the
benefit of the bargain they would have had if the contract
had been fully performed.

The decision of the trial court in

this matter took from the sellers the benefit of their bargain
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to the benefit of the vendee when viewed through the entire
proceeding and the course of events leading up to the termination.

Such result was inequitable because vendee was the only

defaulting party and vendors had committed no defaults.
Another circumstance where the Alaska Court has
refused to enforce literally the forfeiture provisions of a
real estate contract is Williams v. DeLay, Alaska, 395 P.2d
839 (1964) wherein the Court pointed out that in that circumstance,

{a) there was a remaining unpaid balance of the purchase

price of only $575.95,

(b) this balance was tendered into

Court by the buyers almost immediately after it had been ascer-·
tained by the special master during the case,

(c) the buyers

had made valuable improvements upon the property and,

(d) the

property had appreciated considerably in value after execution
of the contract.

The Court held in conformity with the decision

in Land Develompent v. Padgett, supra., that this would cause
a loss to the buyers out of proportion to any injury that might
be sustained by the sellers.
In the case now before the Court, the trial Court did
not weigh the losses to the seller as opposed to the losses
of the buyer and did not apply the Alaska law as it had been
cited herein in Lonas v. Metropolitan Mortgage and Securities
Co., supra., and Alaska Placer Company v. Richard E. Lee, supra.
Other decisions where the Alaska Court has indicated
that in the event of a breach of contract that the responsibility
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of the Court is to put the injured party, that is the nondefaulting party, in the same position he would have been
had the contract been fully performed are:

Green v. Koslosky,

Alaska, 384 P.2d 951 (1963); City of Whittier v. Whittier Fuel
and Marine Corporation, Alaska, 577 P.2d 216 (1978) and McBain
v. Pratt, Alaska, 514 P.2d 823 (1973).
It is appellants' contention that

the trial court

ignored Alaska law and imposed upon the nondefaulting party
the major losses in this case.
There was no showing that the appellant-seller obtained
any windfall profits as a result of the retaking.

There was no

showing that the losses on buyer were out of proportion to the
losses to the seller.

The result of the decision was to impose

all losses on the non-defaulting seller.
POINT II
NOTWITHSTANDING THE PLAINTIFF'S REPEATED DEFAULTS
AND MISREPRESENTATIONS, THE TRIAL COURT, ERRONEOUSLY
REFUSED TO ENFORCE THE CONTRACT TERMS FOR TERMINATION
OF CONTRACT RIGHTS.
At time of trial, respondent testified that the
bank records accurately reflected the record of all payments
made by him under the contract.
215: 1-2)

(Record 205: 14-23; Record

That record of payment was introduced as Exhibit 5

in the proceeding.

Attached to this brief as Appendix "A" is a

chart showing the payments as required to be paid under the
contract and payments as made by respondent, together with a
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summary showing the deljnquency status of the contract at
selected dates.

The record of payments shows that respondent

made the semi annual lump sum payments not as required by the
contract, but within 30 to 45 days thereafter.

The contract,

however, required that each nonth respondent was to pay a
monthly payment of $350.00.

These payments were paid to the

escrow agent, the bank in Fairbanks, and applied to the payrnent of appellant's mortgage to the First National Bank of
Fairbanks upon the same property.

Respondent, himself, had

made every payment that was made, personally, not by his wife,
accountant, agent or by any other person.

(Record 220: 6-12)

Morris further recognized that he was obligated under the
contract to pay a monthly payment every month of $350.00 plus
the two lump sum payments the 1st of February and the 1st of
August each year.

(Record 220: 19-22) Such knowledge and
/

understanding was made abundantly clear in the testimony of
respondent (Record 222: 9-17):
Mr. Jeffs:

What I'm suggesting to you, Mr.
Morris, is that when you were
making these payments, whether
you were in California, Montana,
Fairbanks, Alaska or Brussels,
Belgium you knew that you were
to pay a payment of $350.00 every
month?

Mr. Morris: Yes sir.
Mr. Jeffs:

And you were the only one that
handled the payment?

Mr. Morris: Yes sir.
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On December 3, 1975, appellant sent a letter (Ex. 2)
to the respondent regarding additional property upon which the
respondent was negotiating to purchase.

As a postscript appel-

lant said, "Fairbanks bank indicates that they have not
received payments on the Musk Ox escrow 10557; in fact, that
it is several month's behind".

On the date of that conununica-

tion, respondent was six installments of $350.00 each delinquent,
(Appendix "A")
On December 8, 1975, respondent made two monthly
payments of $350.00.

On December 17, respondent wrote to

Mr. Sykes (Ex. 19) and said:
"I have written the bank on being in arrears my records indicate up to date currently.
So upon their reply, we can check out the
discrepancy."
This was at a time when Mr. Morris knew that he was delinquent
on the contract and misrepresented his records to show himself
to be current.
On December 29, 1975 a letter was sent under the
signature of Steve Arnold, the accountant for appellant herein,
(Ex. 3) enclosing an accounting (Ex. 3(a)) of the $350.00
monthly payments which were due.

The letter pointed out that

the December 8 payment covered the months of July and August
but it was still four month's delinquent with another payment
becoming due on January 1, 1976, making a total by the time
the letter was received of $1,750.00 in arrears, or five monthfy
installments.

Respondent acknowledged his understanding of

such delinquency (Record 211: .17-24).

By Exhibit 3, the
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accountant informed Mr.

Mt:Jvr/.s

~:

"I would appreciate your bringing these
monthly payments current (which are
required over and above the additional
payments) immediately, because both yours
and Mr. Sykes' separate notes are subject
to immediate termination, which the bank
could initiate at any moment."
[Emphasis added]
Respondent acknowledged his receipt of such notice and demand.
(Record 212: 1-8; Record 212: 30; Record 213: 1-2)
In the letter (Ex. 3) Mr.

Arnold had acknowledged

the payment on December 8, 1975 of $700.00 covering July and
August payments.

After receipt of that letter, the respondent

sent a letter to the appellant Sykes dated February 11, 1976

(Ex. 14) in which he represented:
"Got the schedule of payment and there is
a $700.00 check (Dec.) and two $350.00
checks not reflected. Have written to
the bank for them to trace out for me."
The record of payments,

Appendix "A", shows that only payment

of $700.00 .paid during the entire payment period was the one on
December 8 which had been acknowledged in Exhibit 3 and was
shown on Exhibit 3{a).

Respondent falsely and consciously

misrepresented by Exhibit 14, four payments which he knew had
not been paid since he had made all payments himself, and since
his own testimony verifies that the payments made are as refleeted by the bank's records.

Nevertheless, he falsely and

intentionally misrepresented his payments to the appellant
Sykes with knowledge that since they were being paid to the
bank in Alaska as escrow agent, Sykes would not have direct
knowledge about the payments.
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Respondent acknowledged that he never attempted to
correct that delinquency.
Mr. Jeffs:

(Record 223: 4-7):

But your letter, you acknowledge
the letter of December 29, you
were four months behind. When
did you ever attempt to correct
those payments?

Mr. Morris: I never really corrected them,
that's true • • .
Respondent failed to correct the delinquencies despite the fact
that he was handling all of the payments.
Mr. Jeffs:

(Record 223: 21-28)

But you had within your control
all of the payments that you had
paid and the dates on which they
were paid by the checks.

Mr. Morris: Yes.
Mr. Jeffs:

And you had a copy of the contract
and the escrow that told you the
dates on when you were supposed to
pay the payments?

Mr. Morris: Yes.
During this same period of time, respondent was
making representations to appellant Sykes that he had additional
money and wanted to buy more land.

(Record 240: 22-30; Record

231: 1-8)
Exhibit 14 shows that respondent was extending overtures to purchase additional tracts of land during the period
of delinquency.
for land.

Exhibit 16 shows Sykes' response to a request

Exhibit 17, shows respondent's request for discount

on tracts of land and respondent said he had cash on hand to
purch~se

more land but did nothing to correct the delinquency
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and in fact thereafter, increased his delinquency.
shows respondent requesting Tract No. 13.

Exhibit 15

Appendix "A" shows

that as of July 8, 1976 respondent was five installments delinquent and never paid any monthly installments after July 8.
He did pay the August 1, 1976 lump sum payment of $3,000.00,
but failed to pay any additional payments.

The testimony of

respondent shows he knew he was delinquent on the payments
for August,

(Record 218: 22-28) September,

(Record 218:

29-30)

and that he never paid any monthly payments after July of 1976
(Record 225: 8-14).
As reconfirmed at trial, respondent's testimony on
deposition referring to the communication from Mr. Hick, the
accountant for Mr. Sykes, on August 13, 1976 (Record 224:16-23).
"When you received a communication from Mr.
Hick that you were some six or seven payments delinquent • • .
"Uh-huh" . • •
"were you not aware that you had missed
that many payments?" Answer: "Yes".
Question: "You were aware?
Answer: "I was aware that I was behind
a certain amount of payments, six, four,
five or seven; I knew I was behind. Isn't
that what your answer was given?"
"Yes sir."
Answer:
11

11

•

•

•

After the last payment, August 2, 1976, respondent
had communication from Mr. Hick in behalf of Mr. Sykes (Ex.

21).

Thereafter, Mr. Sykes had telephone communication

directly with respondent.

The testimony of Mr. Sykes

(Record 165: 6-30; Record 166: 1-30) shows that respondent
was specifically asked about the delinquent status of the
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payments to the escrow agent in Fairbanks.
17)

(Record 166:

Mr. Sykes testified:
"I asked him what the problem was that we
couldn't get the bank to show us that the
payments that he claimed had been made and
I asked him, too, what the status on it
was".
He said, "the payments are paid and
current".
Again on October 14, 1976 respondent again called

Mr.

Sykes requesting a discount on the Musk Ox property.

After Mr. Sykes had declined to grant the discount, the conversation turned to the delinquent status of the contract.
Mr. Sykes directly confronted respondent on the delinquency.
(Record 169: 4)
"On that occasion, I pinned Mr. Morris down
about what was going on on our accounting.
He said he had been into the bank, his
account was current, and he had made recent
payments into the bank within the past few
days".
Again, the record of payments shows no such payments were
ever made in October and it was a fraudulent misrepresentation of payments made to mislead the appellant Sykes.

These

misrepresentations by respondent were corroborated in the
deposition of De_nnis L. Sykes on written questions, which was
admitted into evidence in lieu of his testimony.

Dennis had

overheard the conversation on the extension phone on October
2, 1976 and again on October 14, 1976.

(Record 80: 31-32;

Record 83: 8-12) wherein Dennis Sykes' deposition says:
"Mr. Morris replied that he had been into
the bank and had already brought his payments
completely current, having just within
the past few days paid a ma]or amount

-24-
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covering some months, receipts of which
perhaps had not reached Utah through
the mails". [Emphasis supplied]
The bank's records submitted by respondent as Exhibit 5
show that the statement was a fraudulent misrepresentation of
the status of his accounts, no payments having been made after
August .2, 1976.
These ongoing defaults, no efforts to correct the
known delinquency and oral and written misrepresentations that
he had brought the contract current, clouded by the letters
claiming to have extra cash on hand to buy other parcels,
preclude respondent's right to ask the Court to grant him
equitable relief.

He has not done equity and cannot ask the

Court to grant equity and impose the loss on appellant.
The trial court should have denied him relief and
should have enforced the contract right of the appellant-seller
to retake possession of the property without reimbursement to
respondent.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT'S RETAKING
WAS AN UNREASONABLE FORFEITURE.
Under Alaska law the reasonableness of a forfeiture
of the payments paid under a land purchase contract are determined

by all of the circumstances leading up to the termination of
contract and the circumstances pertaining at the time of the
termination and thereafter.
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At the time of the execution of the purchase contract
and the execution of the escrow documents, these papers were
read orally, each individually, in-detail by appellant Sykes
to respondent in the preparing attorney's office (Record 256:
5-20).

At that time Mr. Sykes informed respondent that he

only had a thirty-day grace period and
258:6-18)

~hat

was all.

(Record

The escrow papers provide that the bank is to apply

the proceeds of the monies received to the debt upon the property owed by appellant Sykes.

(Record 243:1-13) On December

3, 1975 appellant Sykes sent the first notice of delinquency
(Ex. 2) to Mr. Morris.

(Record 243:12-23)

Morris received

that notice and was aware of the request to correct the delinquency.

(Record 211:21-24)

Sykes sent the second notice of

delinquency and demand for payment of the five delinquent
installments on December 29, 1975 (Ex. 2; Record 271:24-30;
272:1-5).

Mr. Morris received that letter informing him of a

potential termination (Record 211:25-27).

He was aware that

Exhibit 3 notified him that he was $1,750.00 delinquent, or
five installments at that time.

{Record 212:1-6)

He was

further aware of the demand to correct the delinquency.

(Record

212:7-8 and 23-30; 213:1-2)
Instead of responding by correcting the delinquency,
Mr. Morris sent a letter to Mr. Sykes

(Ex. 14) in which he

misrepresented that he had sent payments to the bank, which did
not show on the bank's record.

(Record 213:17-22, 27-30)

that point forward he never made any attempt to correct the
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From

five delinquent installments.

(Record 223:4-7)

In the summer

of 1976 Morris knew he had not paid the July and August payments
to the bank.

(Record 228:9-17)

During this period of delin-

quency, Mr. Morris continued to make overtures for purchase of
lots 13 and 14.

Morris made further representation that he had

extra money on hand if he could get a discount on Musk Ox.
(Record 230:17-30; Record 231:1-8; Ex. 17)
In telephone conversation by respondent to Mr.
Sykes on October 2, respondent told Sykes that he would personally go to the bank and clarify the question of the delinquency
because he said he was current and there was no problem on
his account record.

(Record 278:9-30)

In the later October

14 telephone call respondent reiterated that he had been to
the bank and was current.

(Record 280:26-30)

Sykes gave

Morris a deadline to bring the account current immediately.
(Record 276:21-24) and made oral demand for him to keep the
account current or the contract would be terminated and the
property would be repossessed.

(Record 281:13-17 and 25-30)

During these communications between the parties,
at no time did Sykes ever lead respondent to believe that
it was not necessary for him to keep the monthly payments on
the contract current.

(Record 226:14-26)

Respondent never

gave notice to Sykes that he was not going to continue making
the monthly payments and consistently misrepresented that he
had brought the account current.

(Record 226:26-30; Record
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227:1-7)

Respondent never informed Sykes that he was holding

back on the payments.

(Record 227:30; Record 228:1-2)

All

of this occurred during a time when respondent was mailing all
the payments under the contract (Record 220:6-12), had a personal knowledge that monthly payments were required under the
contract and under the escrow (Record 220:19-22), had personal
knowledge and had been informed that Mr. Sykes depended upon
Mr. Morris to make the .payments to the bank escrow because
of his necessities in meeting the obligations on the mortgage
on the same property.

(Ex. 3)

In as many as 15 telephone

conversations between the parties, Morris never told Sykes
that he was not meeting the monthly payments to the bank and
consistently misrepresented that he had been to the bank, had
checked his own account and had brought the account current.
(Record 227: 12-16) In view of the fact of the repeated delinquencies and defaults of respondent, his lack of good faith in
performing under the contract, and the demands of the bank to
bring the amount current (Exs. 28 and 30) respondent was given
oral notice of impending termination in the October 2 and 14
telephone calls

(Record 169:16-20).

On November 11 the bank

closed the escrow and forwarded the escrow papers in accordance
with the escrow agreement to appellant Sykes.

Sykes thereupon

recorded the Quit Claim Deed from Morris to Sykes in accordance
with the escrow agreement and the contract and in performance
of the contract terms.
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In view of the difficulties imposed upon

\

,,et \p~
(),~'
the~the

respondent:
(a)
the fact that the property was subject
to foreclosure by the bank;
(b)
the seasonal sale of real estate in
Alaska (Record 300:11-19);
(c)
the difficulty of sale of real estate in
Alaska, particularly the Fairbanks area in midwinter
(Record 300:38-30);
(d) Sykes' inability to bring the account
current (Record 300:20-26);
(e)
the efforts of Sykes to sell the property
in the winter (Record 301:1-30; 302:1-30);
(f)
the fact that Sykes only recovered the
amount of the unpaid balance without any windfall
gain (Record 303:17-301 304:1);
(g)
and in fact received less than he
would have received under the completion of the
contract by Morris had Morris kept the contract
current (Record 304:5-10).
lt

this forfeiture of payments was reasonable.

The

multitude of facts and the recognition by the Alaska Courts
~:

of the rights of a contract seller to forfeit payments on the
failure of the buyer to make payments, coupled with the fact

!l

that Morris' own defaults and misrepresentations had created
all of the problems, compels a conclusion that the retaking

)~

of the property by the Sykes in conformity with the contract
terms was not an unreasonable forfeiture and the Court's ruling
that it was an unreasonable forefeiture was in error.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS
ENTITLED TO NOTICE OF THE INTENDED SALE AND REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE DEFENDANT WHOLE BEFORE
THE SALE WAS MADE.
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To evaluate whether respondent was entitled to additional notice before the sale of the property by appellant,
the court must review what had transpired.
There was a long history of delinquency, not entirely
known to appellant because it had been clouded by a pattern of
misrepresentation by the respondent:
(a)
claiming payment not credited, which in
fact were false (Ex. 14, Appendix A);
(b)
claiming additional funds on hand for
more land when still five months delinquent (Ex. 17)
(c)
claims that he would go to the bank and
verify delinquency was cleared up (Record 81:13-16);
(d)
False claims that he had been to the
bank and in past few days had paid major amounts and
brought the account completely current (Record 83:8-13).
This preamble leading up to the termination of the contract
and escrow on November 11, 1976 was followed by another history
of failures on the part of respondent.

On November 18 in

telephone conversations between Sykes and respondent, Mr. Morris wa1
informed that he had been terminated; that he had been misrepresenting the payments and was greatly delinquent (Record
288:6-30).

In that conversation Mr. Sykes reviewed with

respondent the notices that he had been sent and the misrepresentations of having brought the payments current.
response was:

Respondent's

"So what if the account was delinquent and the

bank records are correct, so what difference does it make".
(Record 288:9-23)

In that same conversation on November 18,
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1976 Mr. Sykes informed respondent that if he wished to reinstate he could do so and set forth what the reinstatement terms
would be (Record 289:1-7).

On November 19, 1976 appellant

followed that up with a reinstatement offer (Ex. 29; Record

289:9-19).
At no time after the termination did Morris ever
tender cash or a cashier's check to anyone to correct the
delinquencies and so

t~stified.

(Record 224:24-30).

The

attorney for Mr. Sykes sent a reinstatement letter to respondent (Ex. 10).

Respondent responded to Mr. Hibbert's rein-

statement letter and informed him that he did not wish to
reinstate (Record 249:9-16, Ex. 11)

Respondent rejected the

reinstatment offers (Record 249 and 250).

Respondent was given

several offers to reinstate (Record 178:10-30; Record 179:15-29).
Those reinstatement offers were before the trial court at the
trial (Record 291:1-25).
~

After numerous communications follow-

ing termination and the lapse of the period of time from
November 11, 1976 to February 9, 1977 and in face of the bank's
notice of acceleration and forfeiture (Ex. 30) it was error
for the trial court to rule that Sykes was required to give a
notice of intent to sell and additional opportunity for
respondent to purchase the property prior to the sale.
CONCLUSION
While it is true that in reviewing an equity decision
this Court can examine both the law and the facts, in the
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final analysis, this Court must decide not whether rules of law
were followed, but whether justice and equity were fairly given
to the parties.
The result of the decision 0£ the trial court must
be viewed in that light.
In this matter, appellant performed exactly as the
contract required, never being in default.
Appellant, in the face of repeated reports from the
bank that repsondent was grossly delinquent, continued to give
the benefit of the doubt to respondent because respondent was
transmitting oral and written false claims that he had made
payments for which he had not been given credit or had brought
the account current.

When he was eventually made aware of the

defaults and misrepresentations he followed the parties agreements and terminated the escrow and recorded the Quit Claim
Deed.
Respondent had full control of the matters.

He

paid every payment personally, knew he was required to pay
$350.00 each month.

Nevertheless, he falsely represented pay-

ments never paid, claimed records,he said,showed him to be
current, claimed he had brought the account current and claimed
he had corrected all delinquency.

He further knew he had paid

no monthly payments after July 8, 1976.

He never tendered

funds to bring current or to pay off the balance.

He rejected

reinstatement offers and failed to respond to the attorney's
final letters on reinstatement.
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When weighing the propriety of the trial court's
decision, this Court should conclude that it put the burden
of loss on the nondefaulting party and imposed practically no
losses upon the party with unclean hands, the party who caused
the forfeiture and forced sale of the property.
In this case of unclean hands the Court should not
allow the facilities of the Courts to be used to aid the wrongdoer.
It is respectfully requested that this Court reverse
with instructions to enter judgment of no cause for the respondent.
Dated this 18th day of April, 1980.

m,£7,~~
Jef~

M. Dayle

/

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing

Brief were mailed to A. H. Boyce, Attorney for Respondent, 500
American Savings Building, 61 South Main Street, Salt Lake City,
1~·

Utah 84111 by placing a copy of same in the United States mails,
postage prepaid, this 18th day of April, 1980.

1a::
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APPENDIX "A"

Payments Required
By Contract

Payments Paid By
Plaintiff-Respondent

11/1/74 - $1,000.00

$1,000.00 - 11/ /74
(Exhibit 13)

12/1/74 -

350.00

1/1/75

350.00

2/1/75

350.00

2/1/75

5,000.00

3/1/75

350.00

4/1/75

350.00

5/1/75

3 so • oo

-

l/ aI 7 5

$5,699.00 -

2/4/75

350.00

597.46 -

5/7/75

6/1/75

350.00

449.95 - 6/ /75

7/1/75

350.00

8/1/75

350.00

8/1/75

5,000.00

9/1/75

350.00

10/1/75 -

350.00

11/1/75 -

350.00

12/1/75 -

350.00

$5,323.25 - 9/9/75

Delinquency Status
Of Contract On
Selected Dates

Current

$100.00 delinquent
Current

3 Installments delinquen
$1,050.00

12/3/75 - 6 Installments $ 2, 1 OO delinquent
(Exhibit 2)
700.00 - 12/8/75

L/1/76

350.00

12/29/75 - Exhibit 3
Demand for $1, 7 50. 00
5 Installments
1/1/76 - 5 Installments $1, 7 50 delinquent
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Payments Required
By Contract

Payments Paid By
Plaintiff-Respondent

Delinquency Status
Of Contract On
Selected Dates

350.00 - 1/27/76
2/1/76

350.00

2/1/76

- $3,000.00

350.00 - 2/4/76

$3,316.50 3/1/76

350.00

4/1/76

350.00

5/1/76

350.00

6/1/76

350.00

7/1/76

350.00

8/1/76

350.00

8/1/76

- $3,000.00

9/1/76

350.00

10/1/76 -

350.00

11/1/76 -

350.00
24 Monthly
Installments
Required

2/11/76 - Plaintiff
misrepresents paymentE
(Exhibit 14)

2/20/76

350.00

3/12/76

350.00 -

3/31/76

4/1/76 - 5 Installments $1,750 delinquer

$1,044.00 -

7/8/76

$2,985.00 -

8/2/76

5 Installments
$1,750.00 delinquent

11/1/76 - 9 Installments Delinquent
15 Monthly
Installments
Paid
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